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THE DILEMMA OF THE PROFESSORIATE
MATTHEW W.

FINKINt

PROFESSOR

DOWD'S invitation to attend this Symposium gave
me the charge of addressing "the legal problems . . . involved in
the relationship of faculty members and the university ....
" The
request was so simply put that I quickly agreed. As I began to think
about the topic, I concluded that the request was for an analysis of
the interplay of both social and legal factors currently affecting the
institutional status of faculty members in higher education. This realization was itself an educational experience - I have learned to be
more suspicious of seemingly simple requests.
One of the significant issues in higher education is the degree to
which institutions and faculties will be free to function without unwelcome legal direction or restraint, that is, the degree of autonomy allowed individual faculty members, individual institutions, and
faculties within them. I realize that I have qualified some legal developments as not entirely lacking in felicity and that there will doubtless be dispute about them both within the academic community and
outside it. I am reminded of the difference of opinion between President Perkins of Cornell University and Clark Byse of Harvard, concerning the advisability of the judicial extension of due process into
cases of student discipline. 1 I proceed in the hope that my reservations
concerning some developments treated here will be as happily resolved
by subsequent events as were, I believe, many of the doubts expressed
by President Perkins.
I.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Laws have played a relatively passive role with respect to the
substance of educational decisions. To be sure, private institutions of
higher education are chartered or incorporated by state law and bear
scrutiny, usually of a minimal character, by some state agency. Their
public counterparts are commonly created by state constitution or
statute and bear a closer relationship to the state, particularly in
matters of funding. In addition, state statutes or constitutional amendments may change the general educational mission of a public institution. So, for example, the New Jersey legislature could alter the state's
t Counsel, American Association of University Professors. A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1963; LL.B., New York University, 1967. The views expressed
herein are the author's and do not necessarily represent the policy of the AAUP.
1. Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54
AAUP BULL. 143 (1968).
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teacher colleges to institutions offering broad liberal arts programs.
Indeed, the Pennsylvania legislature not long ago elevated the Indiana
State College in Indiana, Pennsylvania to the Indiana University of
Pennsylvania. Whether such legal alterations have a substantial shortrun impact on the conduct of the educational mission remains to be seen.
In addition, through the funding of its research programs, the
federal government has a profound impact on decisions involving the
direction of research in universities. Unquestionably, the decision of
many researchers to pursue particular interests are circumscribed by the
availability of funds, and thus the priorities are set by the government.
Finally, laws can and have interfered with the substance of educational decisions by, for example, requiring loyalty oaths as a condition
of employment for professors or by withholding certain funds from
institutions which do not allow military recruitment on campus.
Broadly, then, laws have performed three tasks: (1) they have set
the legal framework within which educational decisions are made; (2)
they have encouraged certain kinds of decisions in accord with national,
state, or local priorities, primarily through the funding process; and (3)
in some instances, they have mandated a particular educational decision.
Occasionally, the faculty's role in institutional decision making is
explicitly provided for by charter or statute. In the common case,
however, the institution's board of trustees is vested with the right
and power to govern the institution. The governing board usually
adopts regulations delegating to the administration the general supervision and conduct of the institution's activities, a portion of which
may, in turn, be expressly delegated to the faculty. Two examples,
from the private and public sectors respectively, strike me as fairly
typical. The Bylaws adopted by the trustees of New York University
provide that the "educational conduct of each of the schools and colleges . . . is committed to the faculty of each of the schools" and that,
subject to the approval of the governing board and general university
policy, each faculty determines inter alia entrance requirements, courses
of study, standards of academic achievement, and certifies qualified
degree candidates.2 The Bylaws define qualifications for faculty membership and establish a university senate, composed of faculty, administration, and student representatives, responsible for "discussion of
University-wide policies and proposed changes in University practices
and structure," including the academic program and personnel and
budgetary policies. They also establish a faculty council, consisting of
the elected faculty senators, which serves as the faculty personnel corn2. New York University, Bylaws (May 27, 1960).
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mittee of the senate, and which may consider "any matters of educational and administrative policy" which it may bring to the attention of
the senate or of the president.
The Rules and Regulations of the Minnesota State College Board
provide for the establishment of a "principal agency for faculty participation in college governance" in the constitution of each institution.'
They require that the faculty have "major responsibility" in consultation with students and administration for regulations relating to curriculum, evaluation of instruction, admissions, and academic standards
and, without such required consultation, for all matters of faculty
status. In addition, the faculty is to "participate" through such agencies in the preparation of long-range plans, priorities, and budgets.
A far less explicit section provides for the designation of an organization to represent the faculty on matters of faculty interest coming
before the system-wide board.
Presumably the right of the faculty to participate in institutional
decision making provided by such bylaws and regulations could be
judicially vindicated. Delegations of authority, however, can and have
been selectively withdrawn by institutional governing bodies.4 Moreover, much would depend on the sensitivity of the court to the realities
of academic life. This is not to imply that a sound judicial understanding of faculty-institution relations cannot be achieved 5 but is to
suggest that, perhaps due to inexperience with such institutions, courts
are not always sensitive to the ways of the academic world.6
In any event, there is a paucity of litigation by faculty bodies
seeking to vindicate their rights, although in this litigious age such
a development may not be wholly unexpected. Thus, the profession's
claim to participate in educational decisions, if asserted as a legal right,
rests as yet on largely undeveloped ground.
The essential underpinning for the professor's claim to participate
has not been in the character of his legal but of his professional status.
3. Minnesota State College Board, Rules and Regulations (1971).
4. See, e.g., Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of California at
Los Angeles, 57 AAUP BULL. 382 (1971), a report which concerns the failure of the
Board of Regents of the University of California to renew the appointment of Acting
Assistant Professor Angela Y. Davis. The Board had acted to "relieve the President
of the University, the Chancellor of the Los Angeles campus, and all other administrative officers of any further authority or responsibility in connection with" Miss
Davis' appointment and then proceeded to act itself on the matter. Id. at 390.
5. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
6. Compare Worzella v. Board of Regents, 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411 (1958),
with Ironside v. Tead, 228 App. Div. 940, 13 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. 1939), modified,
259 App. Div. 704, 17 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 283 N.Y.2d 667, 28 N.E.2d 399
(1940). Fortunately the Worcella case has not been followed elsewhere. See Byse,
Academic Freedom., Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worcella v. Board of
Regents, 73 HARV. L. REV. 304 (1959).
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It is by virtue of his particular expertise that the professor expects a
predominant voice in curricular matters, expects to exercise a major
responsibility for the selection and retention of his disciplinary colleagues in the institution, and expects generally to have an important
say in the affairs of the institution.

II.

THE EROSION OF AUTONOMY

A variety of factors are now serving to reduce seriously the degree
of autonomy heretofore enjoyed by the profession. In a thorough and
regrettably unpublished paper entitled "The Twilight of Faculty Autonomy," Robert M. O'Neil discusses a number of these, some of which
are intrinsic to institutional government in a time of much expanded
higher education, but many of which constitute external threats:
legislative interference in the wake of student disruption, particularly
in the passage of laws governing faculty suspension and dismissal processes; legislative determination of faculty workload (and, more recently, the legislative suspension of sabbatical leaves) ; and that time
honored device, the legislative investigation.7 O'Neil goes on to discuss
the implications of increasing resort to the judicial process: court
orders opening schools closed by action of their administrations or
governing boards; suits for reimbursement of tuition and damages by
students and others for campus closings; suits by conservative students
against institutional hiring policies; and a spate of lawsuits concerning
the rights of nontenured faculty members. As if this were insufficient,
O'Neil outlines the advent of surveillance and intelligence activities
conducted on campus by agents of various federal and state authorities
and the conduct of grand jury investigations, one of the more notable of
which, at Kent State, resulted in criticism of the institution's administration for "fostering an attitude of over-indulgence and permissiveness with its students and faculty ...."'
Before returning to more of O'Neil's analysis, I would mention
a new ingredient added to the stew - the intervention of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to compel universities and colleges in receipt of federal contract funds to adopt
affirmative action programs with respect to the hiring and promotion
of females and minority group members. At the time of writing, the
Department is in the process of drafting its guidelines, but in the
interim, it appears to have proceeded on an ad hoc basis. In some
7. R. O'Neil, The Twilight of Faculty Autonomy (available through M. W.
Finkin).

8. Id.
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cases institutional adoption of something bordering on a "quota"
system seems to be implied. The response of one affected institution,
Columbia University, is instructive. In an interim agreement with
HEW, all employment decisions, including those affecting faculty
appointments, must be reviewed and approved by the central administration, a sharp departure from prior practice. Proposed appointments
and promotion of non-minority males will be approved only if the
affected deans and department chairmen can demonstrate unsuccessful
attempts to recruit or promote women and minority group members.9
Another factor raised by O'Neil and, if anything, more urgent
now is the financial picture of higher education. McGeorge Bundy
once attributed the growth of faculty authority since the Second World
War not only to the increased prestige attached to men of learning,
but to the "massive authority of the law of supply and demand"'" as
well. Now, but a few years later, one cannot peruse an issue of the
Chronicle of Higher Education without reading of reductions in
faculty, freezes on hiring or tenure, and comment on whether the
projected oversupply of Ph.D.'s is as severe as predicted. Related to
the financial aspect are the rising criticisms leveled at the tenure system
itself which has long been viewed as an essential defense for academic
freedom and the calls for greater "accountability" on the part of institutions of higher learning. The recent remarks of a high state official
from Maryland in a speech at a state college there seem fairly
typical: "I'm not suggesting that the state government wants to get
deeply enmeshed in the details of administering educational institutions,
but I do warn you that both the legislative and executive branches will
be demanding a careful accounting of where the money goes and what
it buys. You'd better be prepared to give that accounting.""
The result of much of the foregoing - the demands of HEW,
the financial pressures, and the calls for accountability - is a greater
centralization of the university and the assertion of administrative
controls not only on a single campus, but on a system and state-wide
basis. Increasingly, one observes the establishment of educational
consortia, the merger of educational systems, and the creation of statewide super-boards and master planning agencies. In some instances
regional commissions have been established to foster cooperation between the public and private sectors. However valuable some of these
efforts may be, the net result is a significant erosion of the local
faculty's voice in basic educational decisions.
9. Once issued, the guidelines will probably be more rigid than the ad hoc
agreements.
10. Bundy, Faculty Power, ATLANTIC MONTHLY Sept. 1968, at 42.
11. Undoubtedly, similar remarks have been made in every state.
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LEGAL STATUS AND
STATUS

I had mentioned at the outset that not all of these developments
may be entirely unwelcome. Few, I submit, would argue that the
courts should not extend first amendment guarantees to college teachers
in publicly operated institutions. The soundness of judicial review of
alleged deprivations of constitutional rights is supported in some recent
cases overturning nonrenewals of nontenured appointments for political
expression and activity. One recent case, Rozman '. Elliot," gives
pause. The court found the grounds for a decision on nonrenewal
of a nontenured appointment constitutionally permissible and within
the proper discretion of the institution's governing board. The faculty
member had participated in a sit-in following the Cambodian invasion
and the shootings at Kent State. He had also introduced himself
into the negotiations between the administration and student-selected
spokesmen and he had attempted to shape a statement from the administration somewhat stronger than it was prepared to issue. This action,
the court found, could be relied on by the institution's governing board
as a basis for declining to renew the faculty member's appointment:
In no way am I suggesting that a faculty member must parrot
on substantive issues the views of the administration. I do say,
however, that -a faculty member cannot assume, under the protective umbrella of the federal Constitution, the role of or intrude
into another's rightful role of conducting the workings of a
university. His cooperativeness to that extent, at least, was a
matter of proper concern of the Board of Regents, who had to
of faculty member who should be
decide whether he was the kind
3
employed by the university.1
The court appears to have suggested that, while a professor employed
by a publicly operated institution has the constitutional protections
afforded all public employees, his legal status confers no greater rights
or freedoms than others in that broad category. He is under an obligation to cooperate with the employer and not "intrude" himself into
the administration's conduct of the "workings of the university." If
this is a fair reading of the implications of the court's approach, it is
seriously erosive of the freedom claimed by the profession as an academic matter to criticize actively the administration and its policies
and to engage in the workings of a university.' 4 Indeed, most aca12. 335 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Neb. 1971).

13. Id. at 1097.
14. See Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959).
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demics would be hard pressed to discern the line between "cooperation"
and "intrusion."
I note the court's remarks on the professor's status because the
question has also been framed by the extension of the right to bargain
collectively to the faculties of a number of publicly and independently
operated institutions of higher education. The former were extended
the right through the enactment of public employee bargaining laws
which frequently have included the faculties of state colleges and universities, while the latter received the collective bargaining right as a
result of the Cornell University case15 and the subsequently issued
jurisdictional guidelines, effectively extending statutory coverage to
approximately 85 per cent of the private, nonprofit institutions of
higher education in the nation.' 6 Perhaps no other development places
the professor's relationship to the institution in so sharp a light.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has held, in response to the contentions of three university administrations, that the
collective exercise of academic peer judgment by a faculty on matters
of academic status and educational policy does not yield to individual
faculty members a managerial or supervisory status, thus exempting
them from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act. 17 In
Adelphi University,'" however, the issue was not framed so broadly
as to raise the status of the faculty as a whole but only concerned the
status of members of faculty personnel and grievance committees. As
to the narrowed issue, two members of the Board confessed great
difficulty:
[S]temming from the fact that the concept of collegiality, wherein
power and authority is vested in a body composed of all of one's
peers or colleagues, [it] does not square with the traditional
authority structures with which this Act was designed to cope
in the typical organizations of the commercial world. The statutory concept of "supervisor" grows out of the fact that in those
organizations authority is normally delegated from the top of the
organizational pyramid in bits and pieces to individual managers
and supervisors who in turn direct the work of the larger number
of employees at the base of the pyramid.
Because authority vested in one's peers, acting as a group,
simply would not conform to the pattern for which the supervisory
15. Cornell Univ., 183 NLRB No. 41 (1970).

16. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1972).
17. Manhattan College, 195 NLRB No. 23, 79 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1972)

Fordham

Univ., 193 NLRB No. 23, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971); C.W. Post Center, 189 NLRB
No. 109, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971). See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1 et seq.,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
18. 195 NLRB No. 107, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972).
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exclusion of our Act was designed, a genuine system of collegiality
would tend to confound us. Indeed the more basic concepts of
the organization and representation of employees in one group to
deal with a "management" or authoritarian group would be equally
hard to square with a true system of collegiality. 9
The panel proceeded, however, over the dissent of the third member,
to hold the members of these committees to be employees within the
Act. The dissenting member argued that the authority of such relatively small committees was logically unlike the diffuse authority dispersed throughout the faculty and stressed "that individuals do not
have the right ...to sit on both sides of the bargaining table in the
collective bargaining process ' 20 - precisely the argument made earlier
21
by the Fordham administration.
From this auspicious beginning, the NLRB has proceeded to
define bargaining units for faculties in higher education based on
"well settled principles" which developed in the industrial sector, and
which must perplex most academics: part-time faculty will be included
with the full-time faculty, unless there is consent to the contrary ;22
non-teaching professional employees (such as athletic coaches) will
be included ;23 department chairmen may be excluded as supervisors
even if they are colleagues of the full-time faculty but have authority
over part-time faculty (which would be included for unit purposes if
any party to -the proceeding desires their inclusion).24
My purpose has not been to castigate the NLRB but to use its
brief experience, paralleled by actions of the various state boards concerned with similar issues of unit determination in public higher education, to point -to what the labor laws are doing in the area of faculty
representation. I feel it safe to conclude that, in defining bargaining
units, little or no attention has been paid to educational implications.
It should be stressed that the configuration of the bargaining unit
defines a polity for a species of institutional government through collective bargaining. The NLRB, relying on its industrial experience,
but not cheerfully so as I read the Adelphi decision (if that is any
solace to the academics), and various state boards shape new polities
19. Id. at _

_,79 L.R.R.M. at 1555-56.

20. Id. at

,

79 L.R.R.M. at 1557 (dissenting opinion).

21. 193 NLRB No. 23, at ___, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1184.

22. 193 NLRB No. 23 (1971); University of New Haven, Inc., 190 NLRB No.
102 (1972).
23. 195 NLRB No. 23 (1972).
24. 195 NLRB No. 107 (1972).
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which may be wholly at variance with existing patterns of government
which have been established in response to institutional needs.
Further, the implications of exclusive collective representation for
traditional forms of university government are serious, and these same
forms may not emerge untouched by the extension of the labor laws.
There is, for example, a most ominous footnote to the discussion in
Adelphi of the status of internal faculty governing bodies:
The delegation by the University to such elected groups of a combination of functions, some of which are, in the typical industrial
situation, normally more clearly separated as managerial on the
one hand and as representative of employee interests on the other,
could raise questions both as to the validity and continued viability
of such structures under our Act.25
Even in the absence of so unfortunate a conclusion, some observers
have argued that traditional forms of faculty government must eventually be subsumed into the bargaining process, resulting in a vastly
increased role for the administration and a much diminished one for
the faculty.2" Others have failed to find in this development a law
A recent report on the Canadian situation concluded:
of nature."
It would be most unfortunate . . . if the traditional dispersion of
decision-making power within the university were essentially ended
by an all-encompassing system of two-party control. Such dispersion is an indispensable aspect of the pluralism of the Canadian
university, and academic freedom cannot exist in the absence of
pluralism. However, in spite of the monolithic tendencies inherent
in North American collective bargaining, the stronger Canadian
universities may indeed be so resolutely pluralistic that the entire
would simply become another
collective bargaining mechanism
28
aspect of their pluralism.
In any event, the traditional rights and privileges of faculties as
organized bodies and of faculty members as individuals remain to be
developed in the scheme of collective bargaining.
25. 195 NLRB No. 107, at ___ n.31, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556 n.31. For a more
enlightened approach, see Michigan State Univ., No. C691-123 (Mich. Emp. Rel.
Comm'n Aug. 9, 1971); Michigan State Univ., Nos. C70D-52, C70D-53 (Mich. Emp.
Rel. Comm'n Sept. 8, 1971).
26. Boyd, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on University Governance,
ED. 265 (1972) ; Hanley, Issues and Models for Collective Bargaining
in Higher Education, 57 LIBERAL ED. 5 (1971); Lieberman, Professors Unite!,

58

LIBERAL

HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct.

1971, at 61.

27. Finkin, Collective Bargaining and University Governance, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 125, revised in 57 AAUP BULL. 149 (1971); Stevens, The Professors and

Collective Action: What Kind?, May 18, 1971 (paper presented at the Univ. of
Minn. Indus. Rel. Center).
28. B. ADELL & D. CARTER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR UNIVERSITY FACULTY
IN CANADA 79 (1972).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 6 [1972], Art. 3

JUNE 1972]

EDUCATIONAL
IV.

DECISION MAKING

1019

SUMMARY

I hope the foregoing has served to put the dilemma of the American professor in context. He sees the security of his position threatened, the market for his services sluggish, if not diminishing, and such
professional authority as he may possess increasingly removed to
administrative bodies over which he has little influence. Simultaneously, statutory and administrative developments make available a
mechanism whereby he may be able to secure a degree of legal protection for his traditional prerogatives through a collective agreement. Indeed, absent greater protection of professional status afforded
through statutory, charter, or internal regulatory guarantees and a
sensitive judicial approach to such provisions, collective bargaining
may afford the only legal protection of professional interests available
to a deeply troubled professoriate. In seeking that kind of protection, however, the profession subjects itself to the ministrations of
statutes and public agencies and to a process with a well developed
history and mythology distinctly alien to the particular environment
of higher education.
These are, to be sure, only some of the problems Professor Dowd
asked me to address. The canvas he provided was far too large for
my brush. I hope, however, I will have provided something of the
context in which the emerging legal problems of the profession should
be understood.
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